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Abstract
We investigate risk sharing channels across different economic sectors to quantify to
what extent they contribute offsetting idiosyncratic shocks. We examine the two most
relevant channels of smoothing among OECD and EU countries: the international
investment income and the savings channels. We find that the households’ share
in net foreign asset income has a significant role in risk sharing. This surprising
result is strictly related to the accumulation of households’ foreign asset holdings.
On the contrary, governments’ cross-border holdings produce a dis-smoothing effect
and this might be imputable to the holding of EU countries’ assets. This outcome
is reversed for the new EU countries in the post Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
period. With regard to the savings channel, we find that governments significantly
contribute to risk sharing, and more significantly after the inception of the GFC.
Moreover, the dividend smoothing theory reconciles with the risk-sharing findings
since corporations (in particular non financial) significantly smooth shocks through
their savings, however their contribution to risk sharing is weak in the post-GFC era.
Keywords: Risk sharing, savings, net factor income, economic sectors.
JEL codes: F21, F24, F36, F44, G15.
∗Massey University. Corresponding author, f.balli@massey.ac.nz.
†University of Basilicata.
1
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2768608 
1 Introduction
A growing number of studies has proved that greater financial globalization leads to
increased risk-sharing, at least among industrial countries (e.g. Kose et al., 2003; Artis
and Hoffmann, 2008; Kose et al., 2009). Income and consumption smoothing (risk shar-
ing) among countries increases welfare and since monetary policies are not able to buffer
the “asymmetric output shocks”, countries adhering to a union look at risk-sharing as the
ultimate goal of the union. Just to give an example, when the domestic country is in a
recession and other countries in the economic union are experiencing an economic boom,
monetary policies might not be able to address the negative output shocks in the domestic
economy. Therefore, risk-sharing among these countries can be a powerful tool for buffer-
ing these “asymmetric output shocks”.
Risk sharing has been studied and discussed extensively within the international economics
literature. Within the empirical strand of the literature, Asdrubali et al. (1996) first de-
rived a simple way of quantifying the relative contributions of various channels of risk
sharing assessing the extent of risk sharing via these channels among US states. Later,
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) applied the same framework to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Empirical studies have so far emphasized the role
of the various channels between countries and searched for their possible contributions and
determinants.
Therefore, risk-sharing channels have been quantified in a number of works. Sørensen
and Yosha (1998) found that the bulk of consumption risk sharing is provided by pro-
cyclical saving channels, and recent studies (Sørensen et al., 2007; Balli et al., 2011, 2013,
2014; Balli and Rana, 2015) have documented the importance of the net factor income
channel (net asset revenues) on the extent of the risk sharing.
These channels are quite important in explaining risk sharing among OECD or Euro-
pean Union (EU) members, but the contribution of economic agents to risk sharing is still
under-investigated. In other words, the government, households, and corporations sectors
contribute to risk sharing, but the extent of their role has not been so far quantified. In
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this paper we aim to fill this gap by measuring the extent of risk sharing channels among
different sectors of the economy.
Employing a sample of OECD, EU and NEW EU countries over the time horizon 1995–2013
and for the pre and post Global Financial Crisis (GFC) time samples,1 we investigate those
channels of smoothing identified by the extant literature as responsible of the bulk of risk
sharing. Precisely, we study the contribution of the net factor income (net foreign asset in-
come) and the savings channels through each sector of the economy (namely, governments,
households, financial and non financial corporations). We found that, among economic
sectors, households’ international revenues are quite effective in risk sharing, whereas both
financial and non financial corporations do not significantly contribute to buffer shocks.
More interestingly, governments’ investments on bonds have a negative and significant ef-
fect on risk sharing. This outcome might be due to – in particular for EU governments
– involuntary bond holdings of the weaker member states, since this type of investments
leaves no room to risk sharing objectives.
With regard to the savings channel, which represents the bulk of risk sharing, we find
an increasing role of governments. In particular, during the post-GFC period, the govern-
ments’ share on the overall extent of risk sharing via savings increased considerably. This
might be due to the pro-cyclical behaviors of governments to buffer the domestic output
shocks as they increase the government spending to remove the adverse effect of the GFC.
Within the corporations sector, non financial corporations significantly contribute to risk-
sharing, in the pre-GFC period. This is consistent with the dividend smoothing theory, as
firms are prone to pay less dividend in good times and pay more in bad times. However
this dividend payment pattern is ruled out in the post-GFC period when the dividend
payments of the corporations diminished. This states that corporations’ contribution in
risk sharing is vulnerable to deep and persistent global shocks, while, on the contrary,
government’s contribution is quite stable and even much more in the crises periods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly recalls the most
1For a list of countries see Table 1.
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recent and relevant literature on the topic, Section 3 describes methodology and data.
Section 4 reports our empirical findings, while Section 4 concludes.
2 Literature
In this Section, we summarize the main findings of some recent empirical works related
to this paper. The present work is closely related to the category of studies that employ
various regression models to measure the extent of risk-sharing and examine the impact of
financial flows on the degree of risk-sharing. Our empirical work has particular relevance
for studies that routinely monitor the progress of financial integration in Europe (e.g.,
European Central Bank, 2011).
Sørensen et al. (2007) propose a general framework to examine how financial integration
facilitates international risk-sharing. Employing data over the period 1993–2003, they find
that larger holdings of foreign assets are associated with better risk-sharing for EU and
OECD countries, while foreign liabilities do not yield any noticeable risk-sharing. Somewhat
similar results are obtained by Demyanyk and Volosovych (2008), who extend the Sørensen
et al. (2007) study using additional data (1995–2006) and a large sample of countries.
They notice that the effect of diversification on risk-sharing is roughly similar for foreign
assets and liabilities. Balli et al. (2011), on the contrary, find that increased holdings of
foreign assets caused income dis-smoothing during 2001–2007, the years surrounding the
introduction of the Euro. They interpret their result as a consequence of increased business
cycle synchronization across EMU and EU countries.
Bracke and Schmitz (2011), using annual data over 1970–2005 for 35 industrial and
emerging market economies, find that net capital gains behaved in the required counter
cyclical way (particularly since the mid-1990s) but only for the industrial countries, whereas
emerging market economies do not seem to benefit from such risk-sharing. A similar
result is obtained by Kose et al. (2009). Employing annual data over the period 1960–
2004 for a sample of 69 countries – 21 industrial and 48 developing (of which 21 were
emerging economies) – they find that only industrial countries had attained better risk-
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sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization, whereas developing countries
have, by and large, been shut out of this benefit. These findings suggest that financial
globalization has, so far, globally led to asymmetric benefits. Recently, Balli et al. (2012)
examine risk-sharing through capital gains for EMU, EU and other OECD countries over the
period 1992–2007. They find that risk-sharing from capital gains is higher than risk-
sharing from factor income flows, whereas saving remains the most important source of
overall international consumption risk-sharing in the Euro area.
3 Methodology
One simple way to analyze income smoothing from internationally diversified portfolios
is to look at the difference between a country’s GNP and GDP over time. Consider the
following identity
GNP = GDP + rDAD − rFAF
where AF is the stock of domestic assets owned by foreign residents, rF is the rate of
return on these assets, while AD and rD are domestically owned foreign assets and their
returns, respectively. The term rDAD − rFAF is widely known as the net factor income
(NFI). If NFI is not perfectly correlated with GDP, the GNP of a country may be less variable
than it would be in the absence of international assets, thus partially insulating income
streams against the idiosyncratic fluctuations in GDP. Based on this reasoning, Sørensen
et al. (2007) propose an empirical framework for testing the extent of international income
smoothing using the following panel regression
∆ log G˜NP
i
t = vi,t + βf∆ log G˜DP
i
t + i,t (1)
where ∆ ˜log GDPit is the annual change in GDP per capita in constant prices minus the union-
wide (or aggregate) counterpart (∆log GDPt), ∆ log G˜NPit is the annual change in GNP per
capita in constant prices minus the aggregate counterpart (∆log GNPt), and νi,t and i,t
are constant and error terms, respectively. Depending on the sample examined, the ag-
gregate variable corresponds either to OECD, EMU or EU member countries. The reason for
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removing aggregate output fluctuations from country fluctuations is to isolate the smooth-
able output fluctuations (idiosyncratic fluctuations). The slope coefficient βf measures
the average co-movement of a country’s idiosyncratic GNP growth (i.e., the deviation from
aggregate/union-wide GNP growth) with idiosyncratic GDP growth in year t. The lower the
βf , the higher the income risk-sharing and vice versa. Therefore, the scalar 1−βf measures
the amount of income smoothing via net factor income flows. The metric 1− βf will take
the value 1 if risk-sharing is perfect and the value zero if GNP moves one-to-one with GDP.
3.1 A decomposition of the net factor income channel across
sectors
Following Balli et al. (2011) and Balli et al. (2013), we decompose the factor income
channel of smoothing into different sector holders; i.e, Households (HH), Government
(GOV), Financial Corporations (FC) and Non Financial Corporations (NFC). Our es-
timated equations will be of the following type:
∆ log G˜NPfcit = νfc,t + βf,fc∆ log G˜DPit + it (2)
where GDPfcit is simply GDP plus the net factor income, contributed by the financial sector.
Similarly, to capture the effect of households on net factor income risk sharing, we run the
following equation:
∆ log ˜GNPhhit = νhh,t + βf,hh∆ log G˜DPit + it (3)
where GDPhhit is simply GDP plus the net factor income, contributed by the households
(HH). Accordingly, we run the same regressions to capture the extent of the risk sharing
that is contributed by the non financial corporations (NFC) and government (GOV).
3.2 A decomposition of the savings channel across sectors
The role and the extent of channels of risk sharing have been studied extensively by the
previous literature. According to the studies by Asdrubali et al. (1996), Sørensen and Yosha
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(1998), Balli et al. (2011) and Balli et al. (2012), the bulk of the risk sharing is achieved
through pro-cyclical savings and consequently the larger fraction of risk sharing is achieved
through the savings channel. Therefore, in order to obtain a deeper understanding of the
savings channel functioning, we examine which components of saving are more counter-
cyclical. Accordingly, we decompose the net aggregate savings of the whole economy into
households, government and corporate (financial and non financial) savings. Asdrubali
et al. (1996) has performed the following regression to capture the extent of the risk sharing
via savings:
∆ log NDIit −∆ log(NDIit − saving) = νs,t + βs∆ log GDPit + it (4)
where NDIit is the Net Disposable Income and βs provides the extent of the risk sharing via
savings for the time interval, whereas νs,t captures the time fixed effects. The extent of the
risk sharing via savings is different across different regions and time periods. Asdrubali
et al. (1996) quantify income smoothing via the savings channel around 40% across US
states, while it is higher across Canadian regions according to Balli et al. (2012). Balli
et al. (2013) measure the extent of the same channel around 30-40% among European
Monetary Union members (EMU) and OECD countries. In order to decompose the extent of
risk sharing across different economic sectors, we run the following regression:
∆ log NDIit −∆ log(NDIit − savingfc) = νfc,t + βs,fc∆ log GDPit + it (5)
The slope of this equation (βs,fc) captures the extent of the risk sharing via the savings
channel contributed by financial corporations.
Similarly, the slope of the equation below, captures the contribution of the households
(HH) on the extent of the risk sharing through the savings channel. The contributions of
the government (GOV) and non financial corporations (NFC) are also quantified via this
model.
7
∆ log NDIit −∆ log(NDIit − savinghh) = νhh,t + βs,hh∆ log GDPit + it (6)
All the test equations are estimated by using two-step Feasible Generalized Least Squares
(FGLS). At the first step, we estimate the panel by applying ordinary least squares and
use the estimated residuals to calculate the Variance-Covariance matrix. We account for
heteroscedasticity across panels (the estimated variances is different for each country) and
autocorrelation within panels, assuming that the error term in each country follows an
AR(1) process. Due to the short sample and the related difficulties in estimating a country-
specific autocorrelation coefficient, we restrict the autocorrelation parameter to be identical
across countries.
3.3 Data
We use a dataset composed by 23 industrial countries with annual data between 1995
and 2013, surrounding the year of the introduction of the Euro. Country selection is
essentially driven by data quality and consistency requirements. The sample is divided
into several country groups: EU, NEW EU and OECD countries – see Table 1 for the complete
country list. Per capita figures are obtained by normalizing over the population of each
country. All series are expressed in real per capita terms. Major variables such as GDP, GNP,
net savings, population and consumer price indices are taken from OECD National Accounts
detailed tables (Volume II). Table 1 contains the basic ratios that describe the role of the
economic sectors within the economy. The GDP ratio, simply states the contribution of
each sector to the economy, showing that Non-financial corporations (NFC) have a big
share on the economy (63%) and households (HH), on average, contribute to the economy
by 20%. NFI ratio indicates the net factor income contribution of each sector. The net
factor income is simply the net financial asset revenues from abroad and it amounts to
1–3% among financial corporations (FC) and government sectors, whereas it is about -44%
among households and 32% for NFC. Big discrepancies between GDP and GNP occur
for households, since households are strong net financial asset holders from abroad and
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the net financial asset revenues make a remarkable difference between GDP and GNP.
Similarly, higher NFI ratio in the NFC sector is due to the big differences between GDP
and GNP. The big flows of foreign portfolio investments resulted in a relatively bigger
amount of dividend and interest payments to abroad. Figure 1 contains NFI ratios on
the country basis. The remarkable figures among NFC and HH can be also seen among
each country. The contribution of FC and GOV are quite limited. The NDI ratio simply
stands for the contribution of each sector to the total NDI, relative to total GDP. HH
have the biggest portion as it is expected, NFC and GOV also contribute consistently.
Country distribution of the NDI ratio is displayed in Figure 2. The relative contribution
of FC is relatively low, in line with descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 and NDI
ratios are quite similar among countries. Net Borrowing and lending ratios are on average
relatively lower. Governments have, on average, -2% net lending and NFC have -1%.
However, Figure 3 shows the clear difference among countries in terms of net borrowing
ratios. In general, GOV have net borrowing, while for households and NFC there are
marked differences. For Denmark, Netherlands, UK, Sweden, the NFC have a positive
lending ratio, but among other countries NFC have a net borrowing position. FC have a
relatively positive sign among all countries. Similarly, the household borrowing/lending
are scattered among OECD countries. Half of the countries (richer ones) have a positive
lending ratio and relative poorer OECD countries have negative lending ratios.
4 Results
4.1 The net factor income channel
In this paper we analyze the net factor income and saving channels among OECD, EU and
NEW EU countries. Differently from the extant literature, we quantified for the first time the
contribution of different economic sectors to risk sharing channels. Previous contributions
focused on two main channels of smoothing, one of those is the net factor income which
largely consists in the net revenues obtained from the foreign portfolio investments. In the
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last 20 years, the increase in the cross-border portfolio allocation leaded to a considerable
size of net asset revenues relative to GDP. Previous studies by Balli et al. (2011, 2013)
showed that the increased amount of net foreign asset revenues hold by countries has sub-
stantially lead to a higher fraction of risk sharing through the net factor income channel.
In general, the the factor income channel smooths about 8-12% of income shocks across
OECD countries depending on the time period analyzed (Sørensen et al., 2007; Balli et al.,
2011, 2013).
In Table 2, we quantify risk-sharing via net factor income channel for the time horizon
1995–2013. These analyses have been done across different country sets (OECD, EU, NEW EU
members) and across different sectors. At the bottom of each panel, we have quantified
the risk-sharing amounts for the total economies which is 5% for OECD set and 7% among
EU members (coefficient βf ). These results are highly consistent with the previous findings
and more interesting insights can be obtained by looking at the contribution of the sec-
tors. The extent of risk sharing via net factor income is significant and very high across
households (in particular among OECD and EU countries). Between 2008 and 2013, this
coefficient (1− βf,hh) is around 10% and on the overall time interval it is around 5%. It is
quite surprising that corporations (mainly financial) could not contribute substantially to
risk sharing (see Tables 2 and 3). This finding is rather suggestive and called for a deeper
investigation on the households’ international portfolio allocation patterns.
Employing the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Integrated Survey, we were able to gather
data on the shares of sector holders on total portfolios of countries. Table 4 shows the
share of the Households, Government and non Financial sectors on the total foreign equity
and bond assets, respectively. At the first glance, we observe that within the households
sector, in many EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Germany, Italy), the
household’s share in foreign portfolio is quite remarkable. For instance, in Belgium, on
average, households hold around 40% of total foreign equity portfolio between years 2001
and 2014, whereas, Italian households hold around 39% and Spanish households about
35%. All these figures indicate the importance of the household share on total foreign as-
set holdings, thereby leading to the impression that revenues originated from these assets
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might be enough to smooth domestic output shocks.
Another interesting result is originated from the role of the government on risk shar-
ing. From our analysis it emerges its negative and significant dis-smoothing role. Indeed,
dis-smoothing is a weakness of the empirical analysis of risk-sharing models. The negative
coefficient means that the revenues obtained from the government’s foreign investments
are more sensitive to the domestic output shocks and there is absolutely no chance of
smoothing. As an example, it means that if domestic output decreases on average by 10%,
the revenues deriving from international foreign asset decrease more than 10%. It is hard
to explain this outcome but examining Table 4 it is clearly evident that governments hold
mostly foreign bond in remarkable amounts. This pattern is ruled out in Finland and Swe-
den where both governments hold big amount of foreign equity and bond assets.2 However,
Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Finland and Germany hold a huge amount of foreign debts of
the other EU members that are relatively weaker compared to these countries; this is due
to a Euro bond bias among these countries (Balli and Sørensen, 2006; Balli et al., 2014).
Data indicates that these countries are holding Euro bonds voluntarily or involuntarily –
in the case of Greece, to save it from bankruptcy –, so that they do not give interest receipt
revenues and do not allow for risk diversification (domestic output shocks offsetting). As
the economies of the EU members are greatly synchronized there is very little room for
any risk-sharing. To sum up, the dis-smoothing effect deriving from government net factor
income contributions is likely to be originated from the Euro bond bias.
With regard to the NEW EU group of countries, households’ asset holding contributes to
smooth shocks at a comparable extent with respect to the EU states over the full sample
and for the post-GFC period (about 10%), while during the pre-GFC horizon it did not
exert any significant role (see Table 3). One of the most remarkable result is related to the
role of government which smooths about 9% of idiosyncratic risk in the post-GFC period
contrary to the perverse dis-smoothing role played among OECD and EU countries.
2The reason behind this might be imputable to the large participation of Finnish and Swedish Insti-
tutions to the ownership of large national companies such as Ericsson and Nokia. Indeed this might imply
a more similar behavior of the private and government sector.
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On these results might have played a role the emergence of informal economy remit-
tances from OLD EU member states as well as the increase in the flows of migrants from
NEW EU (mainly Eastern European countries) to OLD EU members (see Kahanec et al.,
2010).3 Adhering to the European Union the NEW EU states benefitted from the free move-
ment of workers among EU countries, which favored new flows of workers coming from
NEW EU members, and the emergence of a fraction of grey market in labor.4 The latter
might be the case of workers coming from NEW EU countries who were already illegally resi-
dent in EU countries and employed off the books (particularly frequent in some EU countries
where immigration rules were extremely restrictive). To this regard, it can be mentioned as
in 2014 one third of the remittances coming from European countries went to the Balkans,
Baltics and Eastern Europe (all regions that, at least partially, adhered to the EU during
the 2004 and 2007 enlargements). At the same time, OLD EU countries such as the UK,
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands see among the main recipients of their remittances
those countries belonging to these areas. More precisely, for the UK can be mentioned
Lithuania and Poland; for Germany the main recipients are Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland; while in the case of Italy and Spain the largest recipients is Romania; for the
Netherlands we find again Poland (see International Fund for Agricultural Development,
2015).
3The increase in the number of migrants in the OLD EU states was relevant between 2003 and 2007 and
uneven among the fifteen European countries. In fact, if migrants from Eastern European countries were
mainly absorbed by the UK and Ireland, migrants from Romania and Bulgaria (joining the EU in 2007)
preferred Italy and Spain.
4The enlargement accounted for transitional arrangements for the access to the European labour
market by the “new entrants”. It consisted in the possibility of OLD EU country to apply standard national
immigration rules for the first two years following accession. Then national measures could be extended
for a further period of three years and continue for a further two years if facing serious receiving problems.
However, starting from the 2004 enlargement, the UK and Ireland decided not to benefit of the transitional
arrangements and opened immediately the labor market, then followed Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland
and Italy in 2006; the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 2007; France in 2008; Belgium and Denmark in
2009.
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4.2 The savings channel
The bulk of risk sharing is achieved through the savings channel among the groups of
countries we take into account. Tables 5 and 6 report the results relative to the extent
of risk sharing via savings channel across different economic sectors. The bulk of the risk
sharing via savings (βs) brought about by the whole economy is around 30-40% across
OECD and EU countries over the time horizon 1995–2007, which is consistent with previous
studies (both Sørensen and Yosha, 1998 and Balli et al., 2012 found similar levels of risk
sharing via savings across OECD countries). However, between 2008 and 2013, the extent of
risk sharing decreased considerably, as the GFC changed the pro-cyclical saving behavior
of economic agents. Among OECD countries, there is a sharp decline from 38% to 16%,
similarly to what happened among EU countries. Decomposing the savings channel across
sectors, we are able to clearly single out the contribution of each economic sector. This
approach allows to tailor policy interventions in order to stimulate those sectors showing a
better functioning in risk diversification with respect to the relative channel of smoothing.
The government contribution to risk sharing is stable and substantial. For the period
of 1995–2007, the extent of the risk sharing via government (βs,gov) is 12% and 11% respec-
tively for OECD and EU members and it increased to 20% and 17% in the post-GFC period.
The recent increase in the government role is due to the restriction of the government
due to the 1992 Maastricht requirements regarding government debt, and the subsequent
Stability and Growth Pact, which both have been impediments to risk sharing from pro-
cyclical government saving.5 In the last years, since these countries have met these criteria
and therefore there might be a boost in the risk-sharing via savings, as now governments
are more independent in buffering the shocks.
Households may desire to smooth consumption through personal saving by borrowing
and lending. The ability of individuals to smooth their consumption through cross-country
5Gali and Perotti (2003) find that the Maastricht rules in practice have not limited the ability of fiscal
policy in the EMU to be counter-cyclical. However, their metric is somewhat different from our risk sharing
measure.
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borrowing and lending depends on whether the banking system, and credit markets in gen-
eral, are sufficiently integrated internationally; otherwise, say, an increase in the demand
for loans may increase the domestic interest rate leading to less borrowing. Even though
there are positive amounts of risk sharing gathered with household savings, in both Tables
5 and 6, it is glanced that the extent of risk sharing from household savings (βs,hh) is not
significant in any period of times. It seems that the household savings are quite negligible
at this stage.
The corporate sector contributes to risk sharing if it adjusts patterns of earnings re-
tention so that a larger share of profits is distributed to shareholders during recessions.
This is consistent with the standard textbook view that corporations smooth dividend
payout ratios, adjusting them only in response to shifts in long-run sustainable earnings.
According to the theory, basically, corporations pay more dividends and (save less) during
the recessions, to keep the stock holders safe from suffering capital losses in recessions.
This means the firms will save less in the recessions, i.e. a pro-cyclical saving pattern.
Similarly, in a boom, a firm may decide to pay less dividends to the shareholders, as they
already enjoy capital gains. This leads to more saving in economic booms, again another
pro-cyclical patterns. Constructing the theoretical contribution of corporations on risk
sharing, we have decomposed the corporations as financial and non financial corporations.
We observed clearly that non financial corporations contribute substantially to risk shar-
ing. The extent of risk-sharing via savings (βs,nfc) is around 22% for OECD countries and
15%, for EU members, between years 1995–2007 (see Table 5). In this period, corporations’
contribution significantly improves the extent of risk-sharing. However, in the post-GFC
period, we observe that the extent of risk-sharing decreased considerably becoming clearly
insignificant. This might happen first due to profit and capital losses and, at the same
time, for absent or inadequate corporations’ dividend smoothing policy. Accordingly, the
lack of the divided smoothing leads to a lower amount of risk-sharing. In Table 6 are
reported the results for the NEW EU set of countries that reveal three main issues. First,
in comparison with the OECD and EU countries, the whole economy over the entire time
sample smooths a much lower but relevant amount of idiosyncratic risk. This outcome is
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probably attributable to the lack of smoothing through the government sector (which does
not have any significant role in risk sharing). If we look at the post-GFC period the saving
channel of the NEW EU countries smooths a larger fraction of risk with respect to both EU
and OECD countries (17% against 13% in the EU and 16% among OECD countries). Second,
the role of the saving channel increases in the post-GFC, while it dropped consistently for
EU and OECD countries from pre-GFC to post-GFC time horizons (from 38% to 13% for
EU countries). Third, corporations (financial and non financial) have a smoothing role of
about 9-10% in the post-GFC era, while this is not true for EU and OECD countries. This
might be due to the FDI increase in some NEW EU countries often benefitting of convenient
fiscal regimes which attract multinational companies.
5 Concluding remarks
This work fills an important gap in the risk sharing literature by evaluating channels
of income smoothing through different economic sectors, thus evaluating the contribution
to risk diversification brought about by each category of economic agent. Precisely, we
investigate those channels already recognized by the extant literature as the most relevant
(in terms of the fraction of shocks absorbed) among EU and OECD countries, i.e. the net
factor income and the saving channels. Therefore, we analyze the contribution of house-
holds, government, financial and non financial corporations sectors to these two channels
of smoothing for three groups of countries: OECD, EU and NEW EU.
The decomposition into economic sectors of the channels of smoothing might be par-
ticularly significant in terms of policy implications. Indeed, once identified which sectors
better exploit a certain channel of smoothing, it might be possible to design policies that
could calibrate a set of incentives for those sectors working worse, thus improving shocks
absorption. We detect that as far as the factor income channel is concerned the largest
fraction of smoothing is imputable to households, while the government sector plays a
perverse dis-smoothing role in the OECD and EU, likely due to the Euro bond bias. On the
contrary it smoothes 9% of shocks in the post-GFC period among the NEW EU countries.
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On this latter result might have played a significant impact the 2004 and 2007 EU enlarge-
ments which determined an increase in the flows of migrants form NEW EU (mainly Eastern
European countries) to OLD EU members with a correlated effect on the fraction of NFI due
to remittances.
The savings channel represents the bulk of smoothing among OECD, EU and NEW EU
countries. A major role is played by the government sector for OECD and EU countries and
it is even increasing in the post-GFC period, whereas for the NEW EU states the government
sector has an insignificant impact. On the contrary, for these countries the non financial
corporations sector has the largest part in smoothing risk, however the financial sector
took off just during the post-GFC.
This work sheds new light on the functioning of risk sharing channels by evaluating
the contribution of different categories of the economic agents, thus revealing strengths
and weaknesses of the factor income and saving channels across economic sectors. This
investigation allows a new thinking on the policy interventions to favor risk sharing which,
as it emerges from our empirical investigation, should jointly take into account channel
type and economic sector.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: 1995-2013
GOVT FC HH NFC
GDP ratio 0.13 0.05 0.19 0.63
NFI ratio 0.01 0.03 -0.44 0.24
GDP-GNP ratio 0.88 1.80 0.26 1.87
NDI ratio 0.20 0.03 0.52 0.14
Net Borrowing ratio -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01
GOV, HH, FC and NFC stand for General Government, Households, Financial Corporation and non
Financial Corporation sector, respectively. The time period covered in the study is between years 1995 and
2013. The GDP ratio stands for the contribution of each sector on the total GDP, averaged between years
and countries. Similarly, the NFI ratio is the net factor income (NFI) contribution of each sector divided by
the total GDP. Similarly, NDI (Net Disposable Income) and the Net Borrowing contributed by each sector
to the economy are normalized by total GDP. Countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA
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Figure 2: Net Disposible Income to GDP Ratios
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Figure 3: Net Borrowing to GDP Ratios
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Table 2: Risk sharing via net factor income across different economic sectors (percentage)
Panel A: OECD
1995–2007 2008–2013 1995-2013
(1− βf,fc) 1 –1 2
(2) (3) (3)
(1− βf,govt) −7∗∗∗ −7∗ −9∗∗∗
(2) (3) (3)
(1− βf,hh) 6∗∗∗ 10∗∗∗ 4∗∗
(2) (3) (2)
(1− βf,nfc) 2∗ –2 5∗
(1) (3) (3)
(1− βf ) 3 1 5∗
(2) (3) (3)
Panel B: EU
1995–2007 2008–2013 1995-2013
(1− βf,fc) 1 –2 2
(2) (3) (3)
(1− βf,govt) −6∗∗ −5∗ −8∗∗∗
(2) (3) (3)
(1− βf,hh) 6∗∗∗ 10∗∗∗ 5∗∗
(2) (3) (2)
(1− βf,nfc) 2 –3 4
(2) (2) (3)
(1− βf ) 3 1 7∗∗
(2) (4) (3)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. gov, hh, fc, nfc
stand for General Government, Households, Financial and non Financial Corporations sectors.
Estimated equations allows for heteroscedasticity by using two-step Feasible Generalized Least
Squares (FGLS). The estimations are represented in percentages.
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Table 3: Risk sharing via net factor income across different economic sectors (percentage)
Panel A: new EU
1995–2007 2008–2013 1995-2013
(1− βf,fc) 2 2 2
(2) (3) (2)
(1− βf,govt) −4 9∗ 0
(3) (5) (1)
(1− βf,hh) -2 10∗∗∗ 5∗∗
(2) (4) (2)
(1− βf,nfc) 2∗ –2 5∗
(1) (3) (3)
(1− βf ) -1 7 2
(2) (4) (4)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. gov, hh, fc, nfc
stand for General Government, Households, Financial and non Financial Corporations sectors.
Estimated equations allows for heteroscedasticity by using two-step Feasible Generalized Least
Squares (FGLS). The estimations are represented in percentages.
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Table 4: Shares of sectors on the total foreign assets holdings (percentage)
Equity Holdings Debt Holdings
HH NFC GOV HH NFC GOV
Australia 1.63 0.94 NA NA NA 8.50
Austria 23.90 3.69 0.26 4.40 2.50 39.40
Belgium 39.33 8.40 0.60 7.20 3.40 37.70
Denmark 5.80 4.91 2.14 5.40 3.60 0.80
Finland 3.78 1.60 51.60 1.20 8.50 36.20
France 16.61 12.66 2.12 7.20 4.14 22.20
Germany 44.32 12.12 0.56 4.51 5.40 16.95
Italy 39.04 5.36 0.91 28.14 3.03 0.31
Netherlands 6.90 7.25 NA 1.15 0.48 2.14
Portugal 15.87 19.87 6.57 NA 2.20 0.96
Spain 35.25 20.43 0.00 11.75 6.41 2.14
Sweden 14.25 3.62 18.12 11.42 2.13 16.14
UK 13.12 4.24 0.01 NA NA NA
GOV, HH, NFC stand for General Government, Households and non Financial Corpo-
ration sector.
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Table 5: Risk sharing via savings across different economic sectors (percentage)
Panel A: OECD
1995–2007 2008–2013 1995-2013
(βs,fc) 2 -4 -2
(2) (3) (2)
(βs,gov) 12
∗∗ 20∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗
(5) (5) (3)
(βs,hh) 5 2 2
(5) (4) (3)
(βs,nfc) 22
∗∗∗ 1 12∗∗∗
(5) (3) (4)
(βs) 38
∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 24∗∗∗
(6) (6) (6)
Panel B: EU
1995–2007 2008–2013 1995-2013
(βs,fc) 2 -4 -2
(3) (3) (2)
(βs,gov) 11
∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 13∗∗∗
(5) (5) (4)
(βs,hh) 7 1 3
(6) (4) (3)
(βs,nfc) 15
∗∗∗ -1 10∗∗∗
(3) (3) (4)
(βs) 37
∗∗∗ 13∗∗ 21∗∗∗
(6) (6) (4)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. gov, hh, fc,
nfc stand for Households, Financial and non Financial Corporations sectors. Estimated
equations allows for heteroscedasticity by using two-step Feasible Generalized Least Squares
(FGLS). The estimations are represented in percentages.
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Table 6: Risk sharing via savings across different economic sectors (percentage)
Panel new EU
1995–2007 2008–2013 1995-2013
(βs,fc) -1 10
∗∗ 3
(2) (4) (2)
(βs,gov) 4 3 3
(5) (6) (4)
(βs,hh) 3 -8 2
(5) (8) (4)
(βs,nfc) 6
∗∗ 9∗∗∗ 7∗
(3) (3) (4)
(βs) 12
∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗
(4) (4) (5)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. gov, hh,
fc, nfc stand for General Government, Households, Financial and non Financial Corpora-
tions sectors. Estimated equations allows for heteroscedasticity by using two-step Feasible
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). The estimations are represented in percentages.
26
